We study the optimal subsidy on prevention against premature death in an economy composed of two-person households, where the survival of the spouse matters, either because of self-oriented coexistence concerns or because of altruism. Under a noncooperative household model, the laissezfaire prevention levels are shown to be lower than the first-best levels, to an extent that is increasing in self-oriented coexistence concerns and decreasing in spousal altruism. The decentralization of the social optimum thus requires a subsidy on prevention depending on the precise type of coexistence concerns. Our results are shown to be globally robust to the introduction of imperfect observability of preferences, life insurance, imperfect marriage matching, and myopia. We conclude by studying the optimal prevention in a cooperative household model with unequal bargaining power.
Introduction
As this is now largely acknowledged, individuals can, through their lifestyle, influence their life expectancy to a significant extent.
1 For instance, Balia and Jones (2008) , in their study on premature mortality in Great Britain, while correcting for biases due to endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity, find that lifestyles predict about 25 % of the overall inequality in mortality, with strong contributions of nonsmoking and sleep patterns. 2 The large empirical evidence supporting a significant impact of individuals on their life expectancy raises the issue of the optimal fiscal treatment of prevention. In a pioneer article, Besley (1989) argues that health-related choices are subject to various behavioral imperfections: agents tend to misperceive the survival process, and adopt suboptimal behaviors, which they will regret later on in their life. This supports a governmental intervention aimed at inducing the optimal health-related behaviors. More recently, Leroux et al. (2011a, b) study the optimal subsidy on prevention when agents differ in three characteristics affecting survival prospects: genetic background, myopia, and productivity.
Those studies on the optimal prevention are all based on models where individuals care only about their own survival, but not about the survival of others. Although analytically convenient, that assumption simplifies the problem significantly. In real life, individuals care a lot about the survival of others, such as their spouse, children, parents, and friends. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) showed that an amount of not less than $100,000 per annum would be necessary to compensate the fact of being widowed. Thus, coexistence matters a lot.
The goal of this paper is to reexamine the design of the optimal prevention policy in an economy where individuals care not only about their own survival but also about the survival of others. For that purpose, two particular issues must be studied. First, given that how a person "cares" about the survival of others may matter a lot for the optimal policy design, one needs to examine the structure of individual preferences. Second, the precise way in which decisions are made within the household matters also for the optimal policy.
Coexistence concerns can be of two kinds. On the one hand, a person can exhibit a self-oriented concern for coexistence with the spouse. In that case, the person would like his wife or her husband to survive, to enjoy the coexistence with her or him, who is treated as a good to be consumed. On the other hand, a person can exhibit an altruistic concern for his/her spouse. In that case, the person cares about the total well-being of the spouse, and his/her survival is valued only insofar as this raises the well-being of his/her spouse.
Empirical studies support the existence of large coexistence concerns, but have not, so far, distinguished between self-oriented and altruistic coexistence concerns.
3 However, the two kinds of concerns are far from equivalent regarding the existence of externalities. Under self-oriented coexistence concerns, a person does not take his/her spouse's coexistence concerns into account when choosing how much to invest in prevention, so that externalities arise. If, on the contrary, coexistence concerns are driven by (im)perfect altruism, agents do (partly) internalize the effects of prevention on the spouse's welfare. Hence, whether prevention behaviors give rise to externalities or not depends on the form of coexistence concerns: self-oriented or altruistic.
The distinction between the different ways to care about coexistence can be illustrated by the example of sin goods consumption, i.e., the opposite of preventive behavior. A smoker may well take into account the negative effect of smoking on the duration of coexistence with his family (through the reduction of his life expectancy, and, in case of passive smoking, through the reduction of others' survival chances), but may, in the absence of altruism, ignore the emotional suffering his family will feel from his early death. Selforiented coexistence concerns are a source of externalities, unlike altruistic concerns.
Besides the distinction between self-oriented and altruistic coexistence concerns, another central issue for the design of optimal policy concerns how prevention decisions are made within the couple. Two kinds of household decision models exist: the noncooperative model and the cooperative model. In the former, prevention is chosen by each spouse in such a way as to maximize one's own welfare, subject to one's own budget constraint. In the latter, prevention is chosen in such a way as to maximize the household collective welfare, subject to the household budget constraint.
Noncooperative models seem to be a natural baseline, whatever the group of humans considered is, including the family or the couple. After all, coexistence concerns-egoistic or altruistic-do not imply cooperation, but may lead to various strategic behaviors. 4 A collective choice on individual prevention behaviors does not seem more plausible than a collective choice on individual consumptions. However, the cooperative household model is also defendable, since cooperation is easier to achieve in a couple than in other groups. In particular, the marriage institution, by allowing the use of divorce as a threat, can serve as a commitment device, which forces spouses to act cooperatively (see Cigno 2012 ). We will consider those two classes of household models successively. Nonetheless, we will pay more attention to the noncooperative model, because a large part of prevention can hardly be monitored at the household level, so that the marriage constitutes, in that context, a quite imperfect commitment device. Hence, the noncooperative framework will be taken here as the baseline model.
The present paper proposes to examine the fiscal treatment of prevention when agents have two kinds of coexistence concerns (self-oriented or altruistic) and when prevention decisions take place either in a noncooperative environment, or, alternatively, in a cooperative environment. For that purpose, we consider a two-period economy, where the population is composed of two-person households and where each individual faces risk about his own longevity and about the one of his spouse. Households are heterogeneous in the preferences of the spouses, i.e., various degrees of self-oriented coexistence concerns and of altruistic concerns, but the matching between spouses is perfect.
Prevention takes here the form of a preventive expenditure made at the young age, which raises the probability of survival to the old-age. Moreover, to reflect the observed deterioration of the health status due to aging, it is assumed that an elderly person enjoys autonomy with some probability but suffers from old-age dependency otherwise.
5 Old-age dependency matters in our context because the health status of the spouse is a major determinant of the welfare gains associated with coexistence (see Braackmann 2009) .
Anticipating on our results, we show that, in a noncooperative household, preventive expenditures chosen at the laissez-faire are smaller than the socially optimal ones, to an extent that is increasing in the intensity of self-oriented coexistence concerns and decreasing in the degree of spousal pure altruism. Hence, the decentralization of the first-best optimum requires a Pigouvian subsidy on prevention, which depends on the precise form of coexistence concerns. Moreover, under unobservable preferences, incentive compatibility constraints reinforce the need to subsidize prevention for agents with high coexistence gains. Those results are shown to be robust to the introduction of life insurance, imperfect sorting on the marriage market, and myopia. Turning, then, to the cooperative household model, we show that some public intervention is still justified, even under perfect information, in order to correct for an insufficient prevention due to an unequal division of bargaining power within the household.
By its results, this study first complements health economics papers on optimal prevention under endogenous longevity, but without coexistence concerns.
6 Secondly, we add to the literature on noncooperative family decisionmaking, which examined various issues, but not optimal prevention.
7 Thirdly, we complement also long-term care studies on the optimal policy when 5 Dependency consists of difficulties to carry out daily activities (washing, eating, etc.) . 6 See, among others, Leroux and Ponthiere (2009) and Leroux et al. (2011a, b) . 7 Following contributions of Becker (1974) , Ulph (1988) , Konrad and Lommerud (1995) , and Chen and Wooley (2001) , noncooperative models were applied to various family issues, such as the division of housework (Bragstad 1989) , domestic violence (Tauchen et al. 1991) , expenditures on children (Del Boca and Flinn 1994), and savings (Browning 2000) . children differ in altruism towards parents. 8 Finally, this paper can also be related to the literature on the tax treatment of couples, which did not consider survival.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the laissez-faire. Section 4 derives the utilitarian social optimum and studies its decentralization. Section 5 focuses on the secondbest problem, where individual preferences cannot be observed by the social planner. Section 6 explores the robustness of our results to the introduction of (a) endogenous probabilities of old-age autonomy, (b) life insurance, (c) imperfect marriage matching, and (d) individual myopia. Section 7 compares our results with the ones under a cooperative household model. Section 8 concludes.
The noncooperative model

Environment
We consider a population of individuals who are grouped in couples, composed of one man and one woman.
10 Agents live a first period with certainty and enjoy a second period with a probability π .
11 Surviving agents are autonomous with a probability p and suffer from old-age dependency with a probability 1 − p.
Individuals are heterogeneous in three characteristics:
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• The gender: men, indexed by M, and women, indexed by F.
• The altruism towards the spouse, denoted by α k . We assume two degrees of altruism k ∈ {A, a}: α A > α a ≥ 0.
• The self-oriented concern for coexistence with the spouse, denoted by j i . We assume two degrees of concerns j ∈ {C, c} :
Demography and health
When young, agents invest in prevention against premature death, which raises their probability of survival to the old age. For that purpose, an agent of gender i ∈ {M, F}, with a degree of altruism k ∈ {A, a} and with a degree of selforiented coexistence concern j ∈ {C, c}, invests an amount h kj i in prevention. 8 See Jousten et al. (2005) and Pestieau and Sato (2008) . 9 See Apps and Rees (1988 , 1999 , 2007 , Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) , Cremer et al. (2007) , and Kleven et al. (2006) . 10 Note that relaxing that assumption would not affect our results. 11 The length of a period is normalized to 1. 12 In order to focus on coexistence concerns, we assume that there is no other source of heterogeneity. This implies, among other things, equal resources w for all agents.
An agent of gender i ∈ {M, F} investing h kj i in his or her health will survive to the second period with a probability:
where we assume, as usual, π i (·) > 0 and π i (·) < 0 and 0 < π i (·) < 1. Following the demographic literature on women's physiological advantage (see Vallin 2002) , we assume that the survival function takes a gender-specific form:
with ε < 1, i.e., women have a higher life expectancy than men for an equal investment in their healthh. We denote by p i the (exogenous) probability of being autonomous at the old age, whereas 1 − p i is the probability of old-age dependency, for i ∈ {M, F}.
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Women's physiological advantage implies, ceteris paribus, a higher chance of being autonomous at the old age (Cambois et al. 2008) , so that p F ≥ p M .
Given that agents care not only about their own survival and health but also about the survival and health of their spouse, the number of possible scenarios of life, equal to 3 in a model without coexistence concerns (i.e., healthy survival, unhealthy survival, premature death) is here raised to 3 2 = 9 scenarios. To illustrate this, Fig. 1 shows the lottery of life faced by a man.
Individual preferences
Individual preferences over lotteries of life are assumed to satisfy the expected utility hypothesis.
14 When specifying the welfare associated to each scenario of the lottery of life, we assume that lifetime welfare takes a standard timeadditive form, where temporal utility is state-dependent. 15 The function u(·) denotes the temporal utility of consumption under autonomy, whereas the function v (·) = u (·) − L denotes the utility of consumption under dependency, L being a utility loss due to dependency. As usual, we set u (·) > 0, u (·) < 0.
Regarding coexistence concerns, there exist two ways in which agents care about the survival of others. First, a spouse has a self-oriented or egoistic concern for coexistence, in the sense that the husband, for instance, would like his wife to survive and be healthy if he survives, but this has nothing to do with the welfare of his wife. In sum, partners care about the survival and health of their spouse to avoid loneliness. 16 Second, an agent cares also about what his or her partner feels, that is, about her welfare. That form of concern is usually 13 See Section 6 for an extension with endogenous probabilities of autonomy. 14 This is an obvious simplification. See Leroux and Ponthiere (2009) for optimal prevention when agents are not expected utility maximizers. 15 As usual, the utility of death is normalized to zero. 16 We exclude the possibility that agents could remarry after the death of a spouse. This would complicate our analysis without providing more insights for the issue at stake. Regarding self-oriented coexistence concerns, we assume that coexistence with the spouse enters temporal welfare in an additive form, which depends on the health status of the spouse. Denoting by γ j > 0 the welfare gain enjoyed by an agent with self-oriented coexistence concern j ∈ {C, c} when he coexists with an autonomous spouse and denoting by χγ j the welfare gain enjoyed when coexisting with a dependent spouse, the expected welfare gain for an agent of gender i and type j ∈ {C, c} from the survival of his spouse of gender is as follows:
We refer to this as the "self-oriented coexistence benefits". As one prefers coexistence with an autonomous spouse, we have 0 < χ < 1. Moreover, as γ C > γ c , we have
As far as altruism is concerned, we assume that altruistic concerns enter the utility function in a standard additive way. For the sake of simplicity, altruism concerns uniquely the "private" (i.e., nonaltruistic) part of the spouse's welfare. The degree of altruism of an agent of type k ∈ {A, a} is captured by the parameter 0 ≤ α k ≤ 1, which equals the extent to which that agent is sensitive to his/her spouse's private welfare. 
In Eq. 3, the expected lifetime welfare of the agent is the sum of three terms. The first term is the expected utility of the agent without coexistence concerns. The second term is the expected welfare gain from coexisting with his spouse. The last term reflects altruism: the agent cares about the welfare of his spouse. The last two terms depend on the spouses' joint life expectancy, i.e., 1 
Households
Regarding the composition of households, we assume, for the sake of analytical tractability, a perfect sorting on the marriage market, i.e., the couple formation process is such that agents with some degree of self-oriented coexistence concerns and altruism form couples with agents having the same degree of selfish coexistence concerns and altruism. 18 This yields four types of (k, j)-couples, depending on α k and γ j : types (a, c), (a, C), (A, c) , and (A, C).
As far as the behavior of the household is concerned, we assume that agents, although being in a couple, act in a noncooperative manner. 19 This approach to agents' decisions is probably a stronger assumption inside couples than outside couples, since one can expect cooperation within couples. 20 However, in our context, agents affect their survival prospects through individual prevention, which is quite difficult to monitor at the household level. This is why we take the noncooperative model as a baseline setting.
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The laissez-faire
We focus here on the standard concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is defined here as a pair of individual strategies (c Let us now characterize that equilibrium. We assume that individual savings s i are invested in a perfect annuity market yielding actuarially fair returns (for different risk classes), so that the gross return on annuitized savings, denoted byR 
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The problem of an agent of gender i living with an agent of gender in a (k, j) couple can be written as
As mentioned in D'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009), a noncooperative couple is "an independent management system in which each spouse keeps his/her own income separate and has responsibility for different items of household expenditure". 20 Note that the form of the legislation may also affect how spouses behave within the couple (see Cigno 1991) . Here, we abstract from those legal aspects. 21 We will relax this assumption in Section 7 and see how it changes our results. 22 Another approach consists in assuming that agent do not internalize the impact of h kj i on the annuity return (see Becker and Philipson 1998) .
Rearranging first-order conditions yields
Consumptions are smoothed across periods. 23 The equilibrium condition for prevention equalizes the direct marginal welfare loss of increasing prevention (the RHS), with marginal benefits (the LHS). These benefits are equal to the marginal increase in utility due to a higher survival chance π i h (1 − p i ) L accounts for the additional cost related to dependency, as increasing survival chances also increases the chance to be disabled.
In addition, prevention depends on the welfare gains that agents obtain from coexisting with their spouse. This is represented by the last term on the LHS
The first term inside the brackets is related to the gain the agent gets from coexisting with his spouse, while the second term is related to the fact that he partly internalizes the welfare gains he creates on his spouse by investing in prevention. The higher the selfish concerns (i.e., the higher j i ) and /or the higher the altruistic concern is (i.e., the higher α k ), the higher h kj i is ceteris paribus. Note also that the agent's prevention h kj i is increasing in the level of the spouse's prevention h kj (through the survival probability of the spouse, π (·)), whatever the concern for coexistence, is egoistic and / or altruistic. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a man and a woman in a couple of type (k, j) choose consumption and prevention bundles (c
respectively, in such a way that conditions 4 and 5 are satisfied both for the two spouses. It should be stressed that, in general, nothing insures the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in our economy, that is, the existence of a pair of strategies (c
such that conditions 4 to 5 are satisfied for each spouse. The uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium are not guaranteed either. Additional assumptions on preferences and on the survival functions would be necessary to investigate those issues further.
We assume, in the rest of the paper, that a unique stable Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists. Under that assumption, conditions 4 to 5 can be used to characterize the laissez-faire allocation in our economy. Proof The equalization of consumptions follows from the first-order conditions (FOCs) for optimal consumptions. Regarding the level of prevention, the LHS of the FOC for optimal prevention is, under our assumptions on coexistence benefits, increasing in α k . Hence, a higher α k must, for an equal Note also that the laissez-faire levels of prevention depend on the probabilities of old-age dependency p M and p F , through their impact on coexistence gains j F and j M . The more healthy the old age is expected to be, the more one will invest in the prevention against premature death. Here again, the form of coexistence concerns determines the precise form of the influence of old-age dependency on prevention. Under purely self-oriented concerns, the prevention level depends only on the agent's own risk of old-age dependency. On the contrary, once some altruism exists, the individual investment in prevention becomes increasing with the probability that the spouse is autonomous at the old age.
Proposition 1 Assume that a unique pair of strategies
We can also use the above equilibrium conditions to compare the laissezfaire allocations of men and women belonging to a given couple of type ( j, k).
Proposition 2 At the laissez-faire allocation, we have, inside a given couple
Proof See the Appendix.
It is not obvious to see whether men invest more or less in prevention than women. To see this, let us consider Eq. 5 for two spouses F and M , assuming
Men have a lower probability of survival and autonomy than women, yielding a lower return from prevention. But men obtain from and create on their wife positive welfare benefits, which are higher than the ones created and obtained by their wives, that is, In this section, we use, as the social objective, the standard utilitarian social welfare function, which we regard here as a benchmark social objective. 25 Note that, in our context, it is not straightforward to see how altruistic concerns should be taken into account by the social planner. 26 First, one can consider that the social welfare function should rely on the actual altruistic coefficients, i.e., α k , whatever k = {A, a} is. Second, one could assume that the social planner should not take altruistic concerns into account and should fix all altruistic coefficients α k to zero, on the grounds that altruistic preferences should be regarded as irrelevant for the distribution of income (see Hammond 1987) . A third position consists in claiming that altruistic concerns should be taken into account by the social planner, not in their existing forms, but rather under an ideal form, i.e.,ᾱ should be fixed to 1. The planner should do as if couples were "ideal" couples, in which each member would be able to fully internalize the impact of his actions on the welfare of his spouse.
In this section, we will not adhere to the first position, as it is unfair to make the social optimum dependent on actual altruism. On the contrary, we will impose α k =ᾱ in the planner's objective function. That solution encompasses the second and third positions, withᾱ = 0 andᾱ = 1, respectively.
Centralized solution
The problem of the utilitarian social planner can be written as
24 This is reinforced by the fact that, in equilibrium, consumptions differ across gender. 25 As this is well-known, the aggregation of utilities of agents with different preferences makes sense only if individual utilities are interpersonally comparable. One way to achieve this is, as proposed by Mirrlees (1982, pp. 78-80) , by means of discussions between agents about utilities. In the rest of this paper, we assume that agents can communicate about their life experiences and reach an agreement as to how their welfare should be included in the social welfare function. 26 On this, see Jousten et al. (2005) .
where n k, j is the number of couples with pure altruism α k and coexistence benefit j i . In the Appendix, we show that the optimal allocation satisfies
Consumptions should be equalized across agents and periods. However, prevention is influenced both by the gender through (π i , p i ), and by the type of couple j through j i , but not on α k , as the social planner takesᾱ for every agents. Let us study the reasons for this differentiation.
For that purpose, let us first focus on the differences between h kj F and h kj M , assuming that men and women are from the same couple's type j = {C, c}. In that case, we do not know whether h kj F ≶ h kj M , as two countervailing effects are at work. On the one hand, men have lower probabilities of survival and autonomy, which pushes toward less prevention for men. On the other hand, men influence the welfare of their wife, who have a higher chance to survive and to enjoy the coexistence benefit, i.e., for the same level of prevention,
, which pushes towards more prevention for men. This is taken into account by the term
Proposition 3 At the f irst-best optimum, we have
Let us now study the differences between couples, by considering either men or women. It is clear, from the above conditions, that agents within type C couples obtain higher prevention than agents who belong to type c couples. The reason is that the former couple members create on/and obtain from their spouse a higher welfare benefit from coexistence, in comparison to agents who belong to the latter type of couples. It is thus optimal, from a utilitarian perspective, to favor these couples, as it is a more direct way to increase social welfare.
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The social optimum encourages prevention with respect to the laissez-faire. This is related to the non-internalized (self-oriented) coexistence concerns. In the laissez-faire, agents underinvest in prevention, as they internalize only imperfectly the effect of their decisions on the other's (self-oriented) welfare. The extent of underinvestment in prevention for an agent belonging to a couple with types (k, j) depends not only on how α k differs from 1 (i.e. full internalization), but, also, on the survival chance of the spouse π h kj , as well as on the size of the coexistence benefit for the couple (i.e., the magnitude of Having shown in this section that the laissez-faire equilibrium is not optimal, we show in the following section how to recover the first-best optimum by implementing the adequate tax-and-transfer scheme.
Proposition 4 The f irst-best optimum is such that
(a) h Ck M > h ck M and h Ck F > h ck F ∀α k . (b) if α k < 1: then,
Decentralization of the first best
We assume that instruments available to the social planner are as follows: a tax on savings, τ kj i , on preventive expenditures, θ kj i , and a lump-sum transfer, T kj i , which are type-specific, that is, they can take different values depending on the gender i ∈ {M, F} and on the type ( j, k) of couple, for j ∈ {C, c} and k ∈ {A, a}.
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27 Note that, in comparison with the laissez-faire, we have a larger prevention at the first best, whatever we fixᾱ to 0 or 1. Indeed, at the first best, counting men or women once or twice does not matter, as long as all agents are counted in the same way. 28 We still assume that the annuity market is actuarially fair so thatR 
Comparing these equations with the ones of the first-best Eqs. 6-8 for both spouses, we obtain the following proposition. Proof Optimal tax/subsidies are obtained from comparing the above equations with the ones of the first-best Eqs. 6-8 for all spouses.
Proposition 5 The f irst-best optimum can be decentralized by means of the following taxes on savings and on prevention:
The subsidy on prevention depends on the form of coexistence concerns, i.e., on j and on α k . If, for instance, altruism is perfect (i.e., α k = 1), each couple member perfectly internalizes the influence he has on the other spouse's welfare, so that no subsidy is required and θ kj M = θ kj F = 0. In that case, agents act exactly as the ideal couple and equally care about their welfare and the one of their partner. The decentralization requires only lump-sum transfers towards those having higher coexistence concerns. If, on the contrary, altruism is imperfect, i.e., α k < 1∀k , then distortionary taxation is also necessary, and The optimal subsidy on prevention is not independent from gender-specific probabilities of old-age autonomy. For instance, the more likely is man's autonomy at the old age (i.e., the higher p M is), the larger is his wife's self-oriented coexistence benefit j F . Under imperfect altruism, the wife's coexistence benefits are not fully internalized, and so a higher coexistence gain invites also a higher subsidy on man's prevention ceteris paribus.
The direction of transfers between couples with different types is here unambiguous. This results from the fact that in the first best, h 
Second-best problem
Whereas Section 4 presupposed a perfect observability of the types ( j, k) of couples, it is not straightforward to know a priori which couple is made of members exhibiting high or low self-oriented coexistence concerns and high or low altruism. Individual preferences are hard to observe, and this motivates the study of the second-best problem, in which the social planner cannot observe the types (k, j) of couple but can nonetheless observe genders.
Centralized solution
We set α k = α < 1, ∀k, as we showed that differences in altruism do not affect the first-best allocation. Indeed, the paternalistic planner setsᾱ equal for all agents, and the level of α k matters only for the size of the subsidy on prevention in the decentralized problem. Thus, we also drop the superscript k.
In Section 4, we showed that preventive expenditures of a couple with , and proposes the first-best bundles, type c agents have interest in pretending to be of type C, so as to benefit from higher prevention, which would be a social waste in the absence of real coexistence concerns. Hence, we have to ensure that for each agent of gender i ∈ {M, F} with a spouse of gender , under asymmetry of information, the second-best allocation satisfies the following incentive constraints:
Condition 11 is the incentive constraint for one agent when the partner lies on his/her type. Condition 12 is the incentive constraint for one agent when the partner does not lie, whereas Eq. 13 excludes cases where both partners lie. Couples are here made of agents with homogeneous preferences towards coexistence. Hence, if the government observes with whom one is married, the possibility for an agent, to lie on his/her type is restricted by the type declared by his/her partner, so that the two declared types must be the same. 30 Therefore, condition 12 is not relevant. Furthermore, comparing Eq. 11 with Eq. 13, it is clear that only condition 13 should be binding.
Denoting μ M and μ F the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive constraint 13 for men and women, the second-best problem becomes 29 As for decisions concerning prevention, we assume that agents play noncooperatively (no transfers are possible) and cannot agree to lie on their type so as to obtain higher prevention. 30 It is impossible for a man with c M to pretend to be in a type C couple without a woman with c F pretending also to be in a type C couple, too.
This problem is solved in the Appendix. FOCs for type c agents yield
We present here a simplified version of the results where α = 1 in incentive constraints. 31 We make that perfect altruism assumption to be able to isolate the pure impact of incentive constraints on type C agents:
There is no distortion on consumptions, because, in the utility function, the unobserved source of heterogeneity ( c i ) is additive with respect to consumption. Hence, to prevent mimicking behavior from type c agents, it is sufficient to distort preventive expenditures of type C agents, as these are directly related to coexistence benefits. In Eqs. 18 and 19, the fraction in the last terms inside brackets always exceed unity. Hence, the trade-off between prevention and first-period consumption is distorted downward for both men and women, and prevention is encouraged for type C agents in the second best. This can be explained as follows. Type c agents would like to invest less in prevention, since they have smaller coexistence benefits. It is then optimal to encourage prevention for men and women with type C, as a way to make less desirable their allocation to type c agents and to relax incentive constraints.
Decentralized solution
In the Appendix, we find the levels of the taxes on savings and prevention that decentralize the second-best optimum by comparing Eqs. 14-19 with Eqs. 9 and 10. Proposition 6 When agents are perfectly altruistic (α = 1), the second-best optimum can be decentralized by the following taxes on savings and prevention:
Proof See in the Appendix.
We focus here on the case in which agents are perfectly altruistic, i.e., α = 1, so as to isolate the effect of asymmetric information on taxes. However, in the Appendix, we derive full expressions of the taxes when α < 1. Under α = 1, there is no need to correct for imperfect altruism, and subsidies on prevention should be zero for the mimickers (type c agents). However, when α < 1, we are not able to recover the usual result of "no distortion at the top".
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Let us now study the taxes faced by type C agents. When α = 1, the terms inside bracket of θ C M and θ C F are positive so that these agents face a subsidy on prevention, so as to solve the incentive problem arising under asymmetry of information.
33 By encouraging prevention, the social planner makes the allocation of a type C agent less desirable to a type c agent, as the latter would prefer to invest less in preventive expenditure (since he obtains lower benefits from coexistence). Savings for this type are still neither taxed nor subsidized.
To sum up and take into account both altruism and incentive effects, we find that no agent should face a tax on savings. However, prevention should be subsidized because of imperfect altruism. Type c agents' prevention should be subsidized, to internalize the effect of their actions on the welfare of their spouse (and this would be reinforced by the presence of incentive constraints). Type C agents should face an even higher subsidy on prevention, so as to relax incentive constraints. 32 The reason comes from the difference between the level of altruism set toᾱ = 0 or 1 in the objective function and the agents' level of altruism, α considered in the self-selection constraints. Because of this, we would actually find that, in the second-best, type c agents should face positive subsidies on prevention, θ c M , θ c F < 0 (see the Appendix). 33 Looking at the general expression of θ C i in the Appendix, it is not clear whether assuming α < 1 reinforces the subsidization effect due to the existence of incentive constraints or not.
Extensions and robustness
Endogenous old-age dependency
Let us now relax the assumption of fixed probabilities of old-age autonomy and assume instead that an agent of gender i ∈ {M, F} can affect his probability of being autonomous p i by investing h kj i in his or her health. We have
At the laissez-faire, the problem of an agent of gender i ∈ {M, F} is the same as before, except that his expected lifetime welfare V 
Agents have, here, an additional incentive to invest in health: this raises the probability of old-age autonomy. This extra effect leads to the addition of a second term on the LHS. That additional term has two parts. On the one hand, it raises the direct utility of the agent, as it lowers his probability of being dependent; on the other hand, it increases the coexistence benefits enjoyed by his spouse, thanks to the better health of the old surviving agent.
The first-best problem is the same as problem A, except that the probabilities of old-age autonomy are now endogenous, leading to the FOCs:
Comparing these equations with the standard case in which the probability of autonomy is exogenous (see Section 4) suggests that coexistence externalities are now larger than under exogenous probabilities of old-age autonomy. Indeed, agents not only partly internalize the effect of their prevention on the expected benefit their partner gets from coexistence, that is π i h kj i π h kj j , but also they now only partly internalize that higher prevention will lead to a higher probability of autonomy and, to a higher coexistence benefit for their partner, as represented by
). These differences lead to higher subsidy on prevention.
Using the same procedure as in Section 4.2, we show that the decentralization of this modified first best can now be achieved by the following taxes:
Subsidies on prevention are, ceteris paribus, higher than under exogenous probability of autonomy. This is a consequence of the larger coexistence externalities.
Life insurance
So far, we ignored the possibility to insure oneself against the premature death of the spouse. Once such a life insurance is introduced, each individual of gender i ∈ {M, F} chooses (c 
Life insurance prevents consumptions in the two periods to be equalized. The marginal utility of first-period consumption is now equalized to the expected marginal utility from consumption in the second period. The second condition shows that individuals buy life insurance only if they are altruistic, i.e., if α k > 0, but not otherwise. In this extended model, an agent's prevention does not only benefit to his/her spouse through coexistence concerns but also through the life insurance he/she will receive in case of her husband's death. The first two lines of the FOC for prevention correspond to what we had in the standard model with no life insurance. The last line is related to the benefits obtained by his/her spouse, when an agent invests an additional dollar in his health. As before, if the agent survives, his/her spouse obtains utility from coexisting with him/her. However, the spouse will now have to give up the benefits from As previously, we set α k =ᾱ. It is straightforward to see that we obtain the same FOCs as in the standard problem:
Consumptions should be equalized across agents and periods. The optimal prevention is influenced both by the gender through (π i , p i ) and by the type of couple j through j i . Regarding the decentralization of the first-best optimum, it should be stressed that, in the laissez-faire, consumptions are not equalized across states, because agents may receive life insurance benefits, over which they have no control, in addition to their annuitized savings. Hence, to obtain first-best consumption paths, it is optimal to tax the purchase of life insurance in such a way that the demand for it equals zero, a 34 Therefore, as far as the optimal subsidy on prevention is concerned, we are back to the formula of Proposition 5. 34 Let us assume a unit tax on the demand for life insurance, ϑ. It should be set such that
In sum, the introduction of life insurance influences the amount of prevention prevailing at the laissez-faire. However, the social optimum involves zero life insurance, so that it is optimal to prevent agents from buying such insurance. Hence, the optimal subsidy on prevention is the same as in the baseline model.
Imperfect marriage matching
In this subsection, we assess the robustness of our results to the perfect matching assumption, by supposing, on the contrary, imperfect matching between spouses. To illustrate the effects of imperfect matching, we compare the situations of perfectly matched agents of types (A, C) and (a, c) with the ones of the most imperfectly matched couple, where the man has type (a, c) and the woman has type (A, C) . In that case, the laissez-faire FOCs of the mismatched couple are
for the husband, and, for the wife:
where the tilde refers to the allocation of the mismatched couple. The husband of type (a, c) is likely to spend less on prevention than a husband of type (A, C), since the former internalizes less the welfare effects of his survival. Given that his wife, of type (A, C), cares a lot about his survival, the low matching quality reinforces the size of externalities associated to the choice of prevention by the husband, in comparison to the perfect sorting case with type (A, C) . Note, however, that the low matching quality tends, on the contrary, to weaken the externalities related to the prevention of the wife. Indeed, the wife of type (A, C) is likely to spend more on prevention than a wife of type (a, c) . Given that her husband, of type (a, c) does not care a lot about her survival, the low quality matching weakens externalities with respect to the (a, c) perfect sorting case.
Let us now study the first-best problem while assuming that there is only these three types of couples. Using the FOCs of the baseline model, the optimal allocation of the mismatched couple satisfies
Consumptions should be smoothed across periods and spouses for the mismatched couple. As to the other couples, the FOCs are exactly the same as in the baseline model. Using the results of Proposition 4 (agents with higher coexistence concerns invest more in prevention), we obtain
It is then optimal that a husband whose wife has high coexistence concerns invests more in his health than a man whose wife has low coexistence concerns. However, it is also optimal to make him invest less in his health than if he also had high coexistence concerns. The same reasoning applies for women.
Using the same procedure as in Section 4.2, we find the following optimal taxes on prevention to be faced by a mismatched couple:
Comparing those taxes with the ones under perfect sorting (Proposition 5) for couples of types (a, c) and (A, C), it is not clear whether the taxes are smaller or larger when couples are mismatched than when they are perfectly matched. This depends on the level of prevention made by spouses inside the different types of couples, as well as on the levels of α k and j i . All in all, the degree of marriage sorting influences optimal prevention. But the rationale for subsidizing prevention in case of self-oriented coexistence concerns and imperfect altruism remains valid. Thus, although optimal policy is affected, our results are qualitatively robust to the degree of sorting.
Myopia
In real life, individuals tend to misperceive their survival chances, as well as the impact of prevention of survival prospects. Those behavioral imperfections justify the government's intervention. 35 The goal of this subsection is to assess the robustness of our policy results when agents misperceive the survival process to which they are subject. For that purpose, let us assume that agents perceive their survival probability as being equal toπ i (h) = βπ i (h) with β ≤ 1, while their true probability is π i (h) as defined by (1).
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The preferences of an agent of gender i ∈ {M, F} belonging to a (k, j) 
The laissez-faire problem of an agent is the same as in our standard model except that, now, he believes his survival probability is βπ i h 
Consumption is not smoothed across periods anymore, as agents prefer to consume more in the beginning of their life. Moreover, because of myopia, individuals invest less in prevention with respect to the standard case, since myopia makes them underestimate the probability to enjoy coexistence gains. Turning now to the first-best problem, we assume that the social planner is paternalistic, that is, he would like to correct agents' behavior for their myopia. To do so, the planner sets β = 1 in the social objective function. The 35 On behavioral imperfections in health-related choices, see Besley (1989) . On optimal subsidization of prevention under endogenous life expectancy, see Leroux et al. (2011a, b) . 36 We also assume, for the sake of simplicity, that agents equally misperceive their own survival probability and the one of their spouse. 37 For the sake of simplicity, we assume here that, although agents are myopic about their survival probability, they correctly estimate the return from annuitized savings,R as in the baseline case. This is not contradictory: agents may make mistakes about their own survival but know perfectly the survival rate within the whole cohort.
first-best optimum remains unchanged. Comparing the FOCs of the modified decentralized problem with FOCs 6-8, we obtain the following taxes:
Savings should now be subsidized since myopic agents do not save enough. The subsidy on prevention should be higher than in the model without myopia (see Proposition 5) because of two reasons. First, the agent underestimates the effect of prevention on his own survival and on his coexistence with his/her spouse (1st term in brackets). Second, he underestimates the coexistence benefits he creates on her when surviving (second term in brackets). In sum, introducing myopia reinforces the need to subsidize prevention. The level of the optimal subsidy on prevention is affected, but our results are qualitatively robust to the introduction of myopia.
A cooperative household model
Although noncooperative settings are used in various contexts, several arguments support an alternative modeling of couples, as cooperative entities. One reason is the Coase Theorem (1960) : in the absence of transactions/bargaining costs, parties affected by an externality can agree on an allocation of resources that is Pareto-optimal and independent from the initial assignment of property rights. Hence, a household could internalize coexistence externalities itself, without the government's intervention. Another justification, due to Cigno (2012) , takes the marriage as a commitment device, which guarantees, thanks to the divorce threat, the spouses' cooperation and, hence, immunizes them against externalities. 38 To assess the robustness of our results to the modeling of the household, this section considers a cooperative household model, where spouses decide, on a collective basis, how to allocate their pooled resources to the various spending. 38 Note that those arguments are not decisive in our context. The Coase Theorem applies only to the extent that bargaining costs are limited. That assumption is strong in the present context, where each spouse may require dictatorship for choices related to their own health (on the grounds of one's full property of one's body). This would make household bargaining on health-related choices very difficult. Moreover, marriage is, here, a quite imperfect commitment device, since individual prevention can hardly be monitored at the household level.
Denoting by 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 the bargaining power of the man and by 1 − η the bargaining power of the wife, the problem of the cooperative household is
When agents are perfectly altruistic (i.e., α k = 1), the household's collective objective function coincides with the utilitarian social welfare function, whatever the distribution of bargaining power within the household is. In that case, the noncooperative laissez-faire coincides with the social optimum, and with the cooperative laissez-faire, for any distribution of bargaining power.
Assuming imperfect altruism (i.e., α k < 1), we solve this problem in the Appendix. Rearranging FOCs, we obtain
In the laissez-faire, consumptions should be smoothed across periods for both spouses, while they are different between spouses, depending on their bargaining power. Concerning prevention, the last term inside brackets on the LHS of Eq. 42 is smaller for men than for women when η > 1/2, which pushes toward smaller prevention for men than for women. Let us now turn to the first-best problem. Given that spouses cooperate, there is no need here to correct for externalities. However, the public intervention can be justified here on redistributive grounds. One may actually expect from the utilitarian social planner to ensure that each spouse is treated in an equal way. Thus, the optimal utilitarian allocation corresponds to the case in which spouses have an equal bargaining power, which is equivalent to setting η = 1/2 in the above equations. Using the above FOCs, the first-best allocation satisfies the following: We now compare laissez-faire levels and first-best levels of prevention. For that purpose, we assume that the husband has higher bargaining power in the laissez-faire. 42 In this case, η > 1/2 and the last term inside the brackets in Eq. 42 (resp. Eq. 43) is lower (resp. larger) than the last term inside brackets in Eq. 45 (resp. Eq. 46). Thus, in the first-best, men's preventive expenditures are higher than in the laissez-faire, while these are smaller for women. The underlying intuition goes as follows: at the laissez-faire, since the man has a higher bargaining power, his neglect of his wife's coexistence concerns leads to a prevention that is too small in comparison to what would be decided if they had equal bargaining power. On the contrary, the larger bargaining power of the man makes the women overinvest in her health at the laissez-faire. 43 We finally show how this first-best optimum can be implemented. In fact, when bargaining power is unequally distributed within each couple, the decentralization of the utilitarian social optimum requires governmental intervention. Let us derive some necessary conditions for the decentralization 41 As before, the social planner will set the pure altruism parameter α k toᾱ = 0 or 1. 42 The interpretation is symmetric in case of higher bargaining power of the woman. 43 Hence, at the first-best, intracouple welfare inequalities are smaller than at the laissez-faire. of the first best. 44 For that purpose, we assume nonlinear taxes on savings, τ kj i , and on prevention, θ kj i , as well as lump-sum transfers, T kj , which are differentiated by couples' types. We derive the problem in the Appendix and find that the decentralization of the first-best requires the following:
Contrary to the decentralization scheme of Section 4.2, we now have that, depending on the distribution of bargaining power inside couples, either the husband or the wife faces a subsidy on prevention. If the man has a higher bargaining power than the wife, he should face a subsidy on prevention, while the wife should face a tax. But, in each case, the optimal level of the fiscal instrument is, in absolute value, increasing in self-oriented coexistence concerns and decreasing in altruism α k , as in the noncooperative setting. Like in our standard setup, couples with high coexistence concern receive higher lump-sum transfers. In order to avoid mimicking by type c agents under asymmetric information, the social planner needs to subsidize more the prevention of type C agents. Taking again our example of higher bargaining power of the husband, η > 1/2, we would find that type C men would face a even higher subsidy, while for women belonging to this type of couples, the sign of the tax on prevention would be ambiguous (depending on whether the incentive or the bargaining power effects dominate). For type c agents, the taxes would be identical to the ones that decentralize the first best.
Conclusions
This paper examined the design of the optimal subsidy on the prevention against premature death in the presence of coexistence concerns. For that purpose, we developed a model with risky lifetime, where individuals, who belong to two-person households, care about the survival of their spouse. We compared the levels of prevention at the laissez-faire and at the utilitarian social optimum and examined how the social optimum could be decentralized.
When individuals behave in a noncooperative way, the optimal subsidy on prevention depends on the particular form of the coexistence concern. If the concern for coexistence is driven by altruism, a large part of welfare externalities involved in individual prevention are internalized by spouses, so that a limited public intervention is needed. On the contrary, if coexistence concerns are mainly self-oriented, while altruism is low, a larger subsidy is needed as a consequence of externalities due to individual prevention. In that case, the necessity for the state to intervene is not independent from old-age dependency prospects, which affect welfare gains from coexistence.
Those results were shown to be robust to the introduction of endogenous probabilities of old-age dependency, life insurance, imperfect marriage sorting, and myopia. Furthermore, when replacing the noncooperative household model by a cooperative household model, it remains true that the optimal subsidy on prevention depends on the degree of self-oriented coexistence concern, and on the degree of altruism, the major difference being that the optimal intervention depends now also on the inequality in bargaining power between spouses.
Thus, our findings suggest that what matters for designing the optimal subsidy on prevention is not really how much individuals care about coexistence with the spouse but why they care about it. The problem is that empirical studies on the willingness-to-pay for raising the survival chance of the spouse, such as Needleman (1976) do not tell us whether coexistence concerns are self-oriented or altruistic. One empirical strategy could be to exploit the fact that altruism concerns all aspects of welfare-and not only survival-, but identifying the reasons underlying actions remains difficult. 45 Those difficulties to identify the type of coexistence concerns make secondbest analysis necessary. We showed that, under asymmetric information on preferences, it is necessary to subsidize the prevention of agents with high selforiented coexistence concerns even more than at the first best, so as to solve the incentive problem. Hence, the type of coexistence concerns matters for policy, whether this is observable or not.
Finally, it should be stressed that this study relied on some simplifying assumptions. Firstly, we had, for the sake of analytical tractability, to leave some sources of heterogeneity aside, such as earning capacities. Secondly, we took the household structure as given, whereas that structure could be endogenized through marriage and divorce decisions. Thirdly, we focused only on the utilitarian social optimum. In the light of those limitations, much work remains to be done to characterize the optimal prevention policy under coexistence concerns.
